Noting its reluctance "to read the Rules ... to have made an illegal expansion of our jurisdiction," the court clarified that "a judgment is rendered when there is entry of the judgment on the docket."" 5 Thus, in Kim II, the Ninth Circuit backtracked from its original holding in Kim I and crafted a definition of "rendering judgment" from § 3731 that almost exactly matches the language of the timeliness provision from Rule 4(b). The Ninth Circuit's position does not necessarily favor the rule over the statute; it merely holds that they compel the same outcome.
Resolving a dispute stemming from the government's appeal of a dismissed indictment, the Tenth Circuit in Sasser held that "in case of a conflict between a jurisdictional statute and the Rules of Appellate Procedure, the statute controls." 6 The government's appeal was filed within thirty days of the defendant's appeal but thirty-four days after the original order. The Tenth Circuit ruled for the defendants, citing Rule i(b), which states that "[t]hese rules shall not be construed to extend or limit the jurisdiction of the courts of appeals as established by law. ' limitation [s] .' 8 At no point in the decision did the majority discuss the supersession clause. These three circuits reached two diametric conclusions and a potential compromise position. The Fifth Circuit held that the rule unequivocally trumped the statute, whereas the Tenth Circuit held the reverse. By harmoniously construing both the statute and the rule, the Ninth Circuit may have established a middle ground. While the Ninth Circuit's conclusion avoids an undesirable implied repeal, it may not satisfy the jurisdictional concerns presented in Sasser.
II. THE SUPREME COURT'S LATEST PRONOUNCEMENT ON RULE-BASED AND STATUTORY TIME LIMITS
The Supreme Court in Bowles v. Russell ruled that statutory time limits for civil appeals are mandatory and jurisdictional.1 9 Bowles will influence how lower courts resolve disputes between rules and statutes that govern the timeliness of both civil and criminal appeals. The case affirmed a Sixth Circuit decision, dismissing a habeas appeal for lack of jurisdiction. 2 " The appellant's notice of appeal was not filed within the time period established by statute, even though it fell within the range provided by the district court's order. The majority noted that in a civil case 28 U.S.C. § 2107 establishes appellate time limits for appeals to the circuits, and Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a) carries them into practice."
The Court noted that a difference exists between time limits derived from statutes and those stemming from "court-promulgated rules." ' 
III. A FRAMEWORK FOR ASSESSING RULE-STATUTE CONFLICTS
Three factors should influence courts' adjudication of rule-statute disputes: (1) the recency of the statute's and the rule's enactments; (2) the institutional competencies of the respective authors on the topic; and (3) the degree to which the rule affects substantive rights. The conflict between Rule 4 (b) and § 3731 exemplifies the type of dispute that courts should resolve by privileging the rule over the conflicting statute. 28. The only plausible explanation for the government taking this position in light of the present conflict is the government's failure to anticipate that a rule of statutory primacy would compromise its ability to file criminal appeals.
A. Recency of Enactment
More recently enacted rules should supplant older, conflicting statutes because they are more current reflections of collective wisdom on judicial 
B. Institutional Competence
Judges should also evaluate these conflicts from the perspective of institutional competence. When Congress passed the REA, it delegated some of its powers to the Supreme Court in recognition of the judiciary's superior competence in establishing rules of procedure. In its early deliberations on the REA,' 8 Congress explored the issue of comparative institutional competence in great depth. 3 9 In its 1926 report, the Senate acknowledged that "[a] legislative body immersed in questions of broad public policy only remotely related to the details of court procedure is ill adapted to the framing of court rules." 4 ' The drafters of the REA believed that "Congress would tell the Supreme Court what ... courts may and shall do, but will leave it to the experience of that great tribunal to provide how they shall do it." 4 ' The House Judiciary Committee similarly noted the Supreme Court's expertise, stating that "[t]he bill... [leaves] all detail to the Supreme Court, which is its featural merit. '4 In a strictly comparative sense, the Supreme Court is more competent than Congress at establishing procedures for moving cases from district courts to circuit courts.
4 3 Judges experience procedural challenges daily and are uniquely positioned to draft rules that effectuate the efficient administration of justice. Congress, an institution representative of the general population, does not have as much training, experience, or perspective to craft guidelines superior to those thought optimal by the courts. Congress's sole comparative advantage consider recency in combination with institutional competence and the rule's effect on substantive rights. 
C. Effect on Litigants' Substantive Rights
Apart from these institutional considerations, courts should also consider how the rule affects litigants. The Supreme Court has endorsed the language of the REA, reiterating that "the Rules 'shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right."' ' 46 It has also affirmed, though, that "[iun enacting [the REA], however, Congress expressly provided that [inconsistent laws] ... would automatically be repealed upon the enactment of new rules in order to create a uniform system of rules for Article III courts." 47 Courts therefore must remain sensitive to a rule's potential impact on substantive rights, despite the REA's directive mandating automatic repeal of any statute that conflicts with the rule.
The Supreme Court has not precisely defined what would constitute an abridgment, enlargement, or modification of substantive rights, but the Court's clearest statement on this topic appears in Burlington Northern Railroad )). At present, proposed rules are subject to a six-month period of public comment and hearings, followed by a seven-month period, during which Congress may amend or reject the rule. 
D. Employing Canons of Statutory Construction
Even if the circuits do not wish to give primacy to Rule 4 (b), another possible resolution of this dispute lies in employing the canon disfavoring implied repeals." Courts historically have been reluctant to repeal statutes under the supersession clause, 8 resorting to implied repeal only in instances of irreconcilable conflict. 5 9 On other occasions, however, courts have sought to construe rules and statutes in a manner that avoids the conflict altogether. 6 " In the case of Rule 4 (b), this tactic-similar to the methodology of the Ninth Circuit in Kim II-would lead the Court to conclude that Rule 4(b)'s language controls because a judgment is not "rendered" until it has been "entered." This reasoning enables circuit courts to value the greater competence of Rule 4(b)'s drafter and its more recent enactment, while avoiding the countermajoritarian concerns associated with repealing a statute.
CONCLUSION
The dispute over the relative primacy of Rule 4 (b) and 18 U.S.C. § 3731 can serve as a roadmap for future cases in which rules and statutes conflict. This Comment's suggested three-part evaluation effectuates the intentions of the REA's drafters and should guide judges in determining which time limit prevails. Likewise, trying to construe the two rules without conflict may be a productive strategy for judges disfavoring repeals by implication. This strategy remains faithful to the REA's purpose, promotes the efficient administration of the federal courts, and protects litigants' substantive rights. 
